In this paper we are concerned with backward stochastic differential equations with random default time and their applications to default risk. The equations are driven by Brownian motion as well as a mutually independent martingale appearing in a defaultable setting. We show that these equations have unique solutions and a comparison theorem for their solutions. As an application, we get a saddle-point strategy for the related zero-sum stochastic differential game problem.
Introduction
Credit risk is a kind of the most fundamental, most ancient and most dangerous financial risk. Particularly in recent years it has been greatly concerned once more. The most extensively studied form of credit risk is the default risk, that is, the risk that a counterpart in a financial contract will not fulfil a contractual commitment to meet her/his obligations stated in the contract. Many people, such as Bielecki, Jarrow, Jeanblanc, Kusuoka and so on, have worked on this subject (see e.g. [2-4, 10, 15-17] ).
In a defaultable market, the noise is created by the Brownian motion B as well as a random time τ which is referred to as a default time. Then the information at time t we can get is of two kinds: one from the assets prices, generated by B t and denoted by F t , the other from the default time, generated by the default process H t := 1 {τ ≤t} and denoted by H t . It should be noted here that the default time τ is not an F -stopping time in general. The filtration we consider is the so-called enlarged filtration G := F ∨ H. Then how do we deal with this case? Roughly speaking, we construct a process Γ, called the F -hazard process of τ , by setting Γ t := − ln[1 − P (τ ≤ t)] where P is the historical probability measure. Then the process M, defined by M t := H t − Γ t∧τ , is a G-martingale independent of B. Assume that Γ is absolutely continuous, then there exists an F -adapted process γ, called the intensity process, such that Γ t = t 0 γ s ds. By the well-known Kusuoka's martingale representation theorem, which states that any G-square integrable martingale can be represented as the sum of integrals w.r.t B and M, we know that in a defaultable setting, B and M are of great importance.
When studying the utility maximization problem in a defaultable setting, Bielecki et al. [2] and Lim-Quenez [17] conclude that the value function is a solution of a BSDE with a quadratic driver, which we call BSDE with random default time in this paper. Actually this type of BSDEs appears very naturally. For the evaluation/hedging problem, Bielecki et al. studied the PDE approach in [3] (see also [4] ), where it is assumed that the defaultable market is complete and the dynamics of the primary assets are linear SDEs driven by both B and M. Their goal is to replicate a contingent claim ξ which depends on whether the default event occurs or not. In fact, we know already that the theory of contingent claim valuation in a complete default-free market (see e.g. BlackScholes [5] , Merton [19] and so on) can be expressed in terms of classical BSDEs. Here we will check detailedly in the text that the evaluation/hedging problem of ξ can be represented as a linear BSDE with random default time τ of the following form:
which can be solved thanks to the existence of the risk-neutral measure Q equivalent to the historical probability P . In fact Q is of the following form:
Then we have Y 0 = E Q [ξ] which is called the fair price of ξ. While in general, we do not know the exact values of (u, v, w) but a set Θ they belong to, which will lead to model uncertainty or ambiguity (see e.g. [6, 9] for details). Then in this case, instead of having only one risk-neutral probability measure Q fixed, we will face an uncertain subset of probability measures {P θ : θ = (u, v, w) ∈ Θ}. For this situation a robust way to evaluate ξ is its upper priceŶ 0 achieved by a superhedging strategy andŶ 0 can be calculated bŷ
where Y θ 0 is in fact the fair price for ξ in a fictitious market. In evaluation/hedging problem with this imprecise knowledge of the risk-neutral measure, we will face a nonlinear BSDE with random default time (the general form):
It is worth noting that for the calculation of the upper priceŶ 0 , the generator g is given by g(s, y, z, ς) = sup (us,vs,ws)∈Θ
which can be easily seen from Section 4. We are interested in the problem of the existence and uniqueness of a solution for (1) , that is, whether there exists a unique triple of G-adapted processes (Y, Z, ζ) satisfying (1).
It is well-known that, in the framework of Brownian filtration, the general form of BSDE was firstly studied by Pardoux-Peng [20] . Since then, the theory of BSDEs has been studied with great interest. One of the achievements of this theory is the comparison theorem. It is due to Peng [22] and then generalized by Pardoux-Peng [21] , El Karoui et al. [9] . It allows to compare the solutions of two BSDEs whenever we can compare the terminal conditions and the generators. These results are applied widely to default-free markets. For example, BSDE was firstly applied to the problem of zero-sum stochastic differential games by Hamadene-Lepeltier [11] . From then on, BSDEs were linked with the game problems closer and closer (see e.g. [8, 12] ).
In this paper, we show that under proper assumptions, BSDE (1) has a unique solution. Besides we also establish a comparison theorem. It should be noted here that, the comparison theorem needs one more condition for the generator than the existence and unique theorem, which is different from the classical case. As an application, we deal with a zero-sum stochastic differential game problem, which can also be seen as a utility maximization problem under model uncertainty. For the game, we assume that there are two players J 1 and J 2 whose advantages are antagonistic. The dynamics of the controlled system is
The player J 1 (resp. J 2 ) chooses a control u (resp. v). The object of J 1 (resp. J 2 ) is to minimize (resp. maximize) the cost functional J u,v . In this paper, we show that there exists a saddle point (u
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we list some notations and assumptions we will use. In Section 3, we will first start with a simple model following [3] , which in fact implies the new idea, that is, BSDE with random default time, for credit risk modeling. Then we prove an existence and uniqueness result for BSDEs with random default time and also establish a comparison theorem. In the last section (i.e, Section 4), we solve a zero-sum stochastic differential game problem in a defaultable setting as an application of the study of the previous section. For reader's convenience we present some basic results in the Appendix.
Notations and assumptions
Let {B t ; t ≥ 0} be a d-dimensional standard Brownian motion on a probability space (Ω, F , P ) and (F t ) t≥0 be its natural filtration. Denote by | · | the norm in R m . Let {τ i ; i = 1, 2, . . . , k} be k nonnegative random variables satisfying
For each i, we introduce a right-continuous process {H i t ; t ≥ 0} by setting H i t := 1 {τ i ≤t} and denote by
Just as in the general reduced-form approach, for fixed T > 0, there are two kinds of information: one from the assets prices, denoted by F = (F t ) 0≤t≤T , and the other from the default times {τ i ; i = 1, 2, . . . , k}, denoted by {H i ; i = 1, 2, . . . , k} from the above. The enlarged filtration considered is denoted by
, which indicates that each τ i is a G-stopping time but not necessarily an F-stopping time in the general case. Now we assume the following (see [16] ):
It should be mentioned that (H) is a very general and essential hypothesis in the area of enlarged filtration (see [18] ).
which is just a linear backward stochastic differential equation with random default time τ . Suppose that c < 1, which is in fact a more general condition than that in [3] . Set
In the financial market, Y will be called the fair price of the contingent claim
BSDE with random default time
The model mainly discussed in this part is:
In the defaultable financial market, ξ(H T ) represents a contingent claim needed to be replicated, settled at time T , depending on the event whether the default occurs at time T . Trading occurs on the interval [0, T ]. Z and ζ represent the information of the hedging strategies, for example, in the linear case (see Subsection 3.1), we can compute the hedging strategies by Z and ζ.
The function g is called the generator of (3). Our object is to find a triple
. For this purpose, we first consider a very simple case: g(y, z, ς) is a real valued process that is independent of the variable (y, z, ς).
there exists a unique triple of processes
We have the following basic estimate:
in particular,
and β > 0 is an arbitrary constant. We also have
where the constant C T depends only on T .
Proof. Define
Obviously N t is a square integrable G-martingale. Thanks to Kusuoka's martingale representation theorem (see Appendix), there exists a unique pair of adapted
Since N T = ξ + T 0 g 0 (s)ds, immediately we get (4). The uniqueness is a simple consequence of the estimate (6). We only need to prove the priori estimates. To prove (5), we first consider the case where ξ and g 0 (·) are both bounded. Since
, thus the process y is also bounded.
From the equation (4), we have
We then apply Itô's formula to y Integrating s from t to T and take conditional expectation with regard to G t on both sides, we obtain
From this it follows (5) and (6) . We now consider the case where ξ and g 0 (·) are possibly unbounded. We set Thanks
and
The second inequality implies that the processes y n , z n and ς n are Cauchy sequences in their corresponding spaces. Thus (5) is proved by letting n tend to +∞ in (8) .
Easily we can get y t ∈ S 2 G (0, T ; R) as (7) is a simple consequence of (6) together with B-D-G inequality applied to (4). 2
With the above basic estimates, we can now consider the general case of (3). We assume that g(ω, t, y, z, ς) :
Theorem 3.1 Assume that g satisfies (a) and (b), then for any fixed terminal condition ξ(H T ) ∈ L 2 (G T ; R m ), BSDE (3) has a unique solution, i.e, there exists a unique triple of G t −adapted processes
satisfying (3).
Proof. First we introduce a norm in L
We set
We define the following mapping I from L
Next we will prove that I is a strict contraction mapping under the norm · β . For any two elements (y, z, ς) and
and denote their differences by (ŷ,ẑ,ς) = (y −ȳ,
. By the basic estimate (6), we have
Since g satisfies the Lipschitz condition, we have
Let β = 12(C 2 + 1), then we get
. It follows by the fixed point theorem that BSDE (3) has a unique solution. From (a) and (b), obviously
Remark 3.1 In the above theorem, from the conditions that the generator g satisfies, we know that here g is independent of the last element ς after the default occurs, i.e., g(t, y, z, ς) ≡ g(t, y, z) on t ∈ [τ ∧ T, T ]. Its financial explanation is that after the default occurs the influence factor on the contingent claim is apart from the defaultable risky part absolutely.
Remark 3.2
The solution of (3) is unique, that is to say, if both (Y, Z, ζ) and
Remark 3.3 The uniqueness of {ζ t ; t ∈ [0, T ]} can be explained in this way: 
can be arbitrary adapted random process. In fact, this is a direct conclusion of the truth that
Comparison theorem for 1-dimensional BSDEs with random default time
Consider the following two 1-dimensional BSDEs with random default time:
For the generator function g, we introduce one more assumption: (9), (10) respectively. If ξ ≥ ξ, g(t, Y t , Z t , ζ t ) ≥ g t , a.e., a.s.,
a.e., a.s.. 
Besides, the following holds true (the strict comparison theorem):
Since g satisfies (b) and (c), thus |a s | ≤ C, |b s | ≤ C and c
Applying Itô's formula on Q sŶs , we have
Integrate from t to T and take conditional expectation w.r.t G t on both sides:
e., a.s..
Remark 3.4 In the above, the definition of c s is proper. For simplicity, we only discuss the case k = 1. Indeed, for the case when (ζ s − ζ s )1 {τ >s} γ s = 0, we should have the following equality:
For this we can refer to Remark 3.1 and 3.3, more detailedly, if
, and if γ s = 0 then ζ can be arbitrary and we can choose ζ = ζ.
Remark 3.5 Condition (c) for the generator g is significant for the comparison theorem. In the following we give an example which indicates that the strict comparison theorem will not hold if g does not satisfy (c).
. Clearly g does not satisfy (c). Consider the following two BSDEs:
It is easy to check that (H t , 0, 1), (0, 0, 0) are the unique solutions of (11), (12) respectively. Then we have
while in the meantime we get
where L denotes Lebesgue measure.
The comparison theorem, which allows us to compare the solutions of two BSDEs with random default time, can ensure the attainability of the upper price of a contingent claim in the evaluation/hedging problem. The main idea can be seen in the next section.
4 Application in zero-sum stochastic differential game problem
We are now going to study the link between the zero-sum stochastic differential games in the defaultable setting and the BSDEs with random default time studied in the previous section. First let us describe the framework of the zero-sum game we consider. Assume here that m = d = k and γ t ≥ 0 is bounded. Let x 0 ∈ R m and let X t be the solution of the following stochastic differential equation: 
(iv) σ(t, x), κ(t, x) are invertible and σ −1 (t, x), κ −1 (t, x) are bounded.
Then the process {X t ; t ∈ [0, T ]} exists and is unique. Let U (resp. V ) be a compact metric space and U (resp. V) be the space of all progressively measurable processes u = (
(ii) b(t, x, u, v) is bounded for any (t, x, u, v);
Now for each u ∈ U, v ∈ V, let L u,v be the positive local martingale solution of:
where for any (t, x, u, v), i = 1, 2, · · · , m, the i-th component of κ −1 (t, x)c(t, x, u, v) is larger than −1, i.e., (κ −1 (t, x)c(t, x, u, v)) i > −1.
According to the Girsanov Theorem (see Appendix), P u,v defined by
T is a probability measure equivalent to P . Moreover, under P u,v , the process B u,v t
ds is a Brownian motion, the processes
are G-martingales orthogonal to each other and orthogonal to B u,v t and (X t ) 0≤t≤T satisfies
It means that (X t ) 0≤t≤T is a weak solution for the above stochastic differential equation and it stands for an evolution of a controlled system.
It is well-known that in zero-sum game problems, there are two players J 1 and J 2 . We suppose that J 1 (resp. J 2 ) chooses a control u(t, x) ∈ U (resp. v(t, x) ∈ V ). Now we introduce two functions f : [0, T ] × R m × U × V → R + , satisfying the same assumptions as b, and h : {0, 1} × R m → R + which is measurable, bounded. Let E u,v denote the expectation w.r.t P u,v . Then the cost functional corresponding to u ∈ U and v ∈ V is given by
which is a cost (resp. reward) for J 1 (resp. J 2 ). The object of J 1 (resp. J 2 ) is to minimize (resp. maximize) the cost functional. In this zero-sum game problem, we aim at showing the existence of a saddle point, more precisely, a pair (ũ
Thus let us define the Hamilton function associated with this game problem as following:
Here we should pay special attention to the difference between the notations of the Hamilton function H(t, ·, ·, ·, ·, ·) and the default process H t . Next assume that Isaacs' condition, which plays an important role in zerosum stochastic differential game problems, is fulfilled, i.e, for any (t, x, z, ς) ∈ Proof. Notice that
Then (13) can be transformed to the following: According to the Girsanov Theorem, we can easily obtain , whereũ * (t, X t− ) = u * (t, X t− , Z t , ζ t ),ṽ * (t, X t− ) = v * (t, X t− , Z t , ζ t ). Moreover, the pair (ũ * ,ṽ * ) is a saddle point for the game.
Proof. By Proposition 4.1 (ii) and Theorem 3.1, we can easily get the existence and uniqueness of the solution (Y, Z, ζ) to (14) . Similarly as in The Girsanov Theorem, stated below, can be referred to Kusuoka [16] (Proposition 3.1) or Bielecki et al. [4] (Proposition 3.2.2) .
Theorem A.3 (Girsanov Theorem). Let Q be a probability measure on (Ω, G T ) equivalent to P . If the Radon-Nikodym density η. of Q w.r.t P is given as follows: 
